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A B S T R A C T 
This study reviews the challenges and opportunities encountered by Qatar because of the blockade 
imposed by the neighboring countries, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Bahrain, and Egypt. It endeavors to highlight potential scenarios of the crisis. This paper employs a 
secondary source of information to achieve the objectives, such as books, articles, reports, and 
academic research, which were later subjected to thematic analysis. The findings of this research 
reveal that crisis management was an effective strategy implemented by the Qatari Government. It 
helped Qatari officials to change and transfer the negative impacts to a positive force. The crisis 
management strategy encouraged Qatar to rely on their local industries, improve education and media 
institutes, and use Qatar’s soft power internationally. Although 2017 was a challenging year for Qatar 
due to the crisis, yet the national economy showed an accelerated growth of 5% in the second half of 
the same year.  
© 2021 by the authors. Licensee SSBFNET, Istanbul, Turkey. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license 




The Qatar crisis started on 5th June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt cut diplomatic relations 
with Qatar. The blockading countries banned Qatari airlines and ships from using their air, land, and sea routes (Davison, et. al, 
2017). They issued a list of demands to be fulfilled by Qatar to end this crisis with an ultimatum of ten days to fulfill these demands, 
which included the closure of Al-Jazeera TV channel, reducing diplomatic ties with Iran and cessation of Qatar military coordination 
with Turkey. However, Qatar rejected the demands ultimately, and refused any negotiation with the blockading countries, and 
considered these demands to damage national security and erode Qatar’s sovereignty. Kuwait played the role of mediator in this 
crisis due to its good relations with all Gulf countries. The blockading countries accepted a position. However, the Sultanate of Oman 
was not directly involved in the mediation due to some tense relations with the UAE and KSA (Al-Ansari, et al. 2018). This study 
employs interviews as a primary source of information and books, journal articles, and reports as secondary sources, including the 
Emir of Qatar's speech on the crisis and demands of the blockading countries. These sources are significant in completing the study 
and provide facts and figures on the crisis's advantages and disadvantages and future scenarios. The paper also explains the Kuwaiti 
and Omani positions towards the crisis and the role of Iran and Turkey. It also presents the part of the media and how Qatar responded 
to the crisis. 
Substantial disagreements between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have threatened to undermine its existence. In 
March 2014, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, which was the first of its kind since the GCC 
formation in 1981. This incident set a precedent in terms of dispute resolution between the member states of the GCC. This 
predicament negatively affected the GCC and revealed shifts in the political strategy and the balance of power within the GCC 
(Ulrichsen, 2017). The GCC countries' underlying disagreement is not a new phenomenon, as occasionally having different 
viewpoints led to differences. Such differences raised the point about the GCC's role, nature, and performance as a regional 
organization (Hassan, 2015). The GCC is a regional organization aiming to provide security and prosperity to the Gulf States. Yet, it 
remains operationally ineffective, as evidenced by its failure to prevent Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent threat to Saudi 
Arabia in the early 1990s. Ulrichsen (2009) considered that conflicts between member states and the absence of a regular perception 
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of risk and danger are at the top of the list of reasons why the GCC states did not organize themselves into an overarching defense 
framework.  
Foreign policies of GCC countries have fundamentally changed since the 2011 Arab uprisings. A consensus and caution that has 
been a hallmark of external engagement for decades has given way to a range of ways to have extra assertive insurance policies in 
response to regional and global instability. The Gulf Cooperation Council can be interpreted as an instrument used by the member 
states, as unitary rational actors, to optimize their physical security from outside. GCC countries agreed to a policy of non-interference 
into the internal affairs of any GCC member. They also supported a policy of condemning any support to any party, organization, or 
individuals who seek to threaten the stability and security of any of the GCC member (Hassan, 2015). The return of the ambassadors 
after signing the agreement ended the initial crisis. Still, the central dilemma of lack of confidence among the member states and 
their conflicts of interest was likely to remain the same for time to come, and that is precisely what happened in June 2017. 
This study analyses the challenges and opportunities encountered by Qatar because of the blockade imposed by the neighboring 
countries, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt.  
The paper attempts to highlight potential scenarios of the crisis. This paper employs secondary source of information to achieve the 
objectives, such as books, articles, reports, and academic research, which were later subjected to thematic analysis. 
Theoretical Review and Conceptual Background 
Qatar Crisis 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt declared on Monday, 5th June 2017 that they are cutting off diplomatic 
relations with the State of Qatar and enforcing a blockade by shutting all air, sea, and land ports. This move marked the beginning of 
an accelerated and unforeseen escalation in the systemic and wide-ranging campaign against Qatar, which was based on publishing 
false information and fabricated news, including the Qatar News Agency's Qena web piracy (Government Communication Office, 
2017). Mainly, following the Arab Spring, the split between the blockading countries and Qatar was due to Qatar’s foreign policy. 
They claimed sponsored various protests and political movements, especially the support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. These 
countries accused Al-Jazeera TV channel of subverting the news and fostering discontent in those countries. This diplomatic dispute 
was embedded in Kuwait's mediation, and agreements were signed in 2014 (Kabalan, 2017). The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin 
Hamad Al Thani delivered a speech to Qatar and its residents on July 17, 2017. He talked about the prevailing situation and future 
directions considering the ongoing crisis. The Emir stated that “those who have taken these steps have not realized that the world's 
people do not tolerate injustice. People do not believe the misleading ideas, and there are limits to targeted ads' efficacy, which even 
the perpetrators themselves do not think so. Therefore, the Arab and non-Arab countries have supported us or did not stand with the 
blockade. The countries that took these steps relied on Western allegations of terrorism. However, it soon became apparent that both 
the Western and we would not embrace the charge of terrorism merely because of political discord or for reasons such as undermining 
pluralism at home by tarnishing other countries' reputation isolating them on the international scene. The conduct undermines the 
war on terror, apart from being unjust” (Government Communications Office, 2017). The Emir, Sheik Tamim, through this speech, 
managed to reassure his people and every resident in Qatar and gave them a feeling of security and stability. He encouraged people 
that Qatar's things would not change, and the speech gave everyone in the State of Qatar a hope. This is how the president of any 
state talks to his people during unexpected events in the country and asks his people to ignore any blockade countries' messages to 
live in peace. In short, Qatari people and residents stand with the government in the crisis, and their love for Emir of Qatar is not 
something new; it is the result of successful government management (Al-Sharq Newspaper, Jun 10, 2018).  
Qatari foreign minister Sheik Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani was interviewed by CNN channel broadcaster Becky 
Anderson in 2019 regarding the crisis demand. He was asked, “How do you think of these demands. He said, “We in Qatar want to 
recognize and investigate the grievances and find remedies that will shield us from a possible crisis in the future. The demands 
include closing the Al-Jazeera channel, reducing the level of ties with Iran, and closing the military base in Turkey, and cutting off 
contact with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Wall Street Journal published a report stating that Doha would cut ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a gesture to resolve a dispute soon, is that true?” (CNN Arabic, Dec. 16, 2019).  Some countries, including Kuwait 
and Oman, offered mediation as a tool of conflict resolution. Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, conducted a mediation shuttle with 
his Arab Gulf colleagues. He hosted the Qatari Foreign Minister and the Kuwaiti Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs in Washington 
DC. Besides, US President, Trump, called the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, the crown prince of UAE, and the Emir of Qatari in 
July 2017 to express his desire to resolve this crisis (DePetris, 2017). Trump showed that the blockading countries' demands are 
unrealistic and impractical (Khouri, 2017). People of the Gulf region were disappointed as the crisis continued. Kuwait, a GCC 
member and a close friend of all conflicting parties, failed to reconcile the crisis. Consequently, the Gulf Cooperation Council has 
been divided into three groups. The first includes KSA, UAE, and Bahrain that represents the politics of blockade; the second group 
includes Oman and Kuwait that works to protect the GCC establishment. The third is Qatar's state as a blockaded country.  
Qatar’s response to the crisis has been significant and rapid to finding alternative commercial products in record time, forming new 
alliances, and achieving self-sufficiency in agricultural and industrial products. By relying on collective management, Qatar faced 
the crisis and adopted a strategy through which it suffered all the consequences, especially at the political and economic levels (Gulf 
Times Newspaper, 2018). Moreover, Qatar has been able to stand against the blockade due to its significant reserves, many import 
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options, various sea, and air outlets, and significant-scale investment-related economic partners (Al Jazeera, Jun 5, 2019). Emir 
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani said, “Rationality and commitment will build our independence building to protect our national security 
and improve our bilateral relations with countries worldwide. We are called upon to open our economy to initiatives and investment 
to generate our food and medicine and diversify our sources of income, and to achieve our economic freedom in bilateral partnership 
ties with other countries, in our geographical environment and throughout the world, and based on common interests and mutual 
respect. We are also called upon to improve our educational, academic, and media institutions and all our soft strengths on an 
international level” (Government Communications Office, 2017).  
Roots of Qatar Crisis 
According to Smith (2019), Qatar's crisis roots are its independent foreign policy pursued in recent years. Qatar has taken a more 
positive line towards political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, than neighboring countries that tend to see them as a threat 
to their legitimacy. Thus, Saudi Arabia accuses Qatar of financing “extremist organizations” and giving refuge and voice to KSA 
and UAE opponents. Though, Qatar accused KSA and UAE of being despotic and on the wrong side of history, taking a more positive 
line on the Arab uprisings of 2011. The origins of the demand to close Al-Jazeera could be traced back to the Arab Spring in 2011 
(Al Jazeera, June 5, 2017). Nevertheless, political tensions have a long history in the Arab Peninsula. According to Kinninmont 
(2019), the main reason for the rift is that the blockading countries refused Qatar’s support for Islamist movements in the Middle 
East region, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Quartet has raised the stakes with a list of thirteen demands for Qatar 
to change its policies, including the Al-Jazeera TV channel's closure. This demand has helped Qatar comprehend that it is being 
punished for supporting pro-democracy movements and free media, rather than justifying the blockading countries' performance. 
Qatar Foreign Policy & Arab Spring: Since 1995, Qatar has been working to shape its independent foreign policy. However, this 
required to build a new system for its international relations and find different ways to reduce Saudi influence. Thus, it used to mean 
such as the Al-Jazeera media platform as a powerful TV station that promotes the interest of Qatar's state. It has been working to 
increase its political impact on international matters through mediation. Besides, Qatar has made real progress in economic 
development, which has made it economically stable, in the region and the whole world, with Qatar owning assets in countries such 
as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Abu Sulaibn, 2017). Many scholars such as Falk (2018), Lucas (2017), and Lynch 
(2017), report that Qatar's independent foreign policy and the Arab Spring are a source of tension between Qatar's and its neighboring 
GCC countries. Arab spring is one of the main reasons for the difference in the vision of the blockading countries and Qatar. Also, 
since the 2011 Arab revolutions outbreak, Qatari policy has clashed with Emirati diplomacy (Al- Eip (2020).  
The Role of Mass Media: Schoemaker & Stremlau (2014) argue that most of the available literature takes the conventional view that 
media plays a role in fostering post-conflict cooperation. Mass media can lead the nations to conflict due to its strength. By such 
power, the press will transcend conventional borders and connect people dispersed around the world. Al-Jazeera TV channel is being 
instrumental in limiting world politics (Ghanem, 2018). Al-Jazeera's full media independence has ensured it has become the primary 
source of information in the Arab world. More precisely, Al-Jazeera offers favorable consideration to some political movements 
conflicting with KSA and UAE's interests, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Allegation of Funding “Terrorism”: The primary long-term cause of the dispute between the blockading countries and Qatar is 
Doha's political support for Islamist groups that are politically associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Saudi-led camp claims 
that there is no distinction between the Brotherhood and the more openly militant terrorist groups they face regarding the danger 
posed by such parties. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE consider Qatar as a politically and militarily support Islamist groups who 
have a perception that political Islam was an ascendant force in the region. Qatar is seen pushing to improve its global influence by 
communicating with specific groups on behalf of the international community; and a willingness to question the status quo, including 
the rule of traditional Saudi allies (Al-Mokh, Z. (2019). 
The Egyptian political regime led by Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, crashed the Muslim Brotherhood as the primary political opponent and 
banned their activities. Egypt agreed to join the Saudi-led coalition against Qatar based on recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood 
as a “terrorist group”. Egypt became a main actor in the Qatar crisis as the blockading countries consider the Muslim Brotherhood 
as a terrorist group and believed that Qatar is supporting the Brotherhood. Yet, as a member of the GCC, Kuwait thinks the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait as a political party and has representatives in the parliament (Chughtai, A. (2018).   
General Implications on Qatar Crisis 
Objectives of the Blockading Countries 
The following table explains the motivations of the blockading countries and their objectives against Qatar. It is about the leader's 
personalities, family, regime’s security, foreign policy competition, and societal perspectives. Foreign policy competition is 
considered as the most critical factor. Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, Saudi Arabia and its allies have taken significant 
steps to enhance their regimes against possible political changes. Saudi Arabia and UAE have been involved in the war in Yemen. 
The United Arab Emirates has been supporting the warmongers in some countries in the region, especially in Libya. In contrast, 
Qatar has helped the people's choice through uprisings in the region by young generations against oppression regimes (Partridge, 
2018).  




Table 1: Drivers & Motivations of Arab Quarte 
 
Source: Kinninmont, 2019 
The Role of Iran & Turkey 
Iran and Turkey have dealt with the Qatar crisis with intense pragmatism, as both countries have substantial opportunities to enter 
the Qatari market and increase their presence in its arena. In addition to announcing their support to Qatar in the face of the boycott 
vote, Tehran and Ankara have sent shipments of food and other goods to Doha via coastal and remote air and sea routes. Turkey was 
swift to improve its military presence by accelerating a Doha base's construction and conducting joint exercises with the Qatari armed 
forces. Qatar has also opened to directly draw Turkish investments to reward Turkish support for Doha in its crisis (TRT World, Nov 
26, 2018).  
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On 11th June 2017, Iran announced that it had sent four aircraft to Qatar, carrying 90 tons of perishable food, mostly vegetables and 
fruits (Financial Tribune, Dec. 3, 2017). Turkey sent its first marine ships loaded with 4,000 tons of food and goods to Qatar on 21st 
June 2017 (TRT World, 2017). In August 2017, the first direct transport service for refrigerated products between Qatar and Turkey 
was launched to operate regularly. It was ensured that it arrives from the Turkish port of Izmir within eleven days. As for Iran, it 
allocated a seaport to facilitate the transportation of goods and food commodities, specifically to Qatar, with three shipments per 
week via ships (Al Jazeera, Nov. 14, 2017).  
Media Role in the Crisis  
Tactics of using more advanced technologies like cyberwar are being used by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. For example, 
employ social media to harass and detain people who showed online sympathy for Qatar. The UAE imposes jail sentences of 3 to 15 
years and fines of 500,000 Dirham on those showing support for Qatar State (Kabalan, 2018). Moreover, the U.S. intelligence claimed 
that the UAE government was behind the Qatar News Agency's hacking, in which hackers attributed false claims to Emir of Qatar. 
The hack's timing and purposive intent could be considered an act of war. While media can be used as a war instrument to suppress 
freedoms and legitimize conflicts, it is also an essential element of democracy. Participatory democracies are most prominently 
enabled through the media, which facilitates a free forum for discussion. Referring to the GCC's current crisis (Wahyuni, 2018). 
geopolitical complexities seem to have been used as an excuse to crack down on media activists. “Media and information literacy 
are critical and underpin many of the global media agenda issues, including "fake news" and online combating violent extremism” 
(Sharaf, 2017).  Governments and communities should encourage policies that allow individuals to "make choices about their media 
consumption and have access to pluralistic viewpoints," not those aiming to limit access to news media. Al-Jazeera and other news 
organizations play a vital role in bringing stories to the fore - stories of interest to Arabs and people worldwide (Gasim, 2018).  
Advantages of the Crisis on Qatar 
Despite the harmful impact, Qatar has benefited from the crises. Qatar's government made the best efforts to turn the crisis into 
advantages. The latter kept Qatar fighting against the blockading countries without fear (Sloan, 2019). Some of these advantages are 
discussed as follow:  
Social Impacts of the Crisis: The siege united the Qatari people, including those with views on public affairs, under the leadership of 
His Highness Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. The Emir appeared to them as an inspirational leader, and this appeared in public 
discourse, in children's faces, and in the "murals" that spread throughout Qatar. The blockade has stirred the creative energies into 
expressing patriotism, opposing the blockade and adhering to the principles announced in the Emir's lofty speech, which embodied 
the situation in Qatar “we honor ourselves first and foremost. I call on everyone to continue this approach and not fall into what is 
not suitable for our prince and us. It is a strong sign of the "siblings" lost because of loss of direction and lack of perspective (Naheem, 
2017). Its bright orientation cast a shadow over Qatari's imagination in the fields of poetry, television images, radio and television 
shows, plastic arts, and social media as well” (REF). The composers and singers also mastered the sublime presentation of the  
"patriotism", expressing what is simmering in Qataris' hearts and their standing against the right to injustice (Doha International 
Family Institute, 2018). 
Positive Impacts on the Economy: The year 2017 has been a challenging year for Qatar for several reasons. Although there has been 
some substantial growth, headwinds affected the national economy. Economic data from Qatar shows that growth accelerated to 5% 
G.D.P. Growth in the second half of 2017 was due to a rapid rebound from the political and economic blockade, with potential 
economic forecasts for the crisis future projections for economic growth and development remain balanced and positive (Qatar Ports 
Management Company, 2017). The column graph in the next Figure illustrates the differences between the GDP annual Growth rates 
(July 2015- July 2018). The growth rate of Qatar's GDP in July 2017 shows a sharp drop. In terms of growth rate in July 2017, it 
reached 0.8%, and this drop is reasonable as the country is under the crisis in the same period. Nevertheless, in 2018 there was a 




Figure 1: Qatar GDP Annual Growth Rate (Jul 2015 - Jul 2018). Source: tradeeconomics.com 
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Positive Impacts on Imports & Exports: Qatari government depends on land and sea imports to sustain its population's bare 
necessities. Qatar imports 90% of its food, 40% through Saudi Arabia, and UAE borders (Baabood, 2017). Qatar's imports heavily 
depend on KSA and UAE. Besides, when the boycott took place in Ramadan, there was a total shortage of essential products on the 
supermarket shelves in Qatar, as the people hurried to stockpile necessities. However, Qatar has identified alternative sources of 
imports of essential commodities through Iran, Turkey, and Oman (Azween, 2017). The graph in the next figure shows Qatar exports 
between 2008 and 2018. In 2012, 2013, and 2014 the Qatari exports reached approximately 140 billion dollars, while, in 2017 reached 
67.5 billion dollars.  
 
Figure 2: Qatar Exports (2008-2018) Source: stata 
Swiftly, the Qatari government created a strategy against the crisis. The Qatari exports jumped and touched at 84.29 billion dollars. 
The next figure shows the exports in Qatar between 2019 and 2020. It can be seen that Qatar depended on its local industry and their 
export started to increase as the export amount reached to 84.29 billion dollars in 2018 while in 2020 Qatar export reached to 235.99 
billion dollars. It is clear that since April 2019, Qatar's export was slightly increased (Plecher, Mar 4, 2020). 
 
Figure 3: Qatar Exports (Apr 2019-Jan 2020; Source: Tradingeconomics 
Positive Impact on Logistics: Qatar ports reported exceptional performance in 2018, despite the continuing blockade imposed on 
Qatar's state. After a year of unprecedented success, in 2018, all ports could reach new record rates of container handling and 
productivity and break old records for processing. Despite the continued blockade and the closure of its land borders, Qatar has 
reinforced its resilience in the logistics sector and affirmed its capacity to resolve the conditions generated by the blockade (Hijazi, 
May 27, 2019). The year 2017 was the most productive year for Qatar ports as they officially started operations in Hamad Port. Qatar 
launched a transitional economic plan based on self-reliance to secure its needs, preserving the independence of production and 
manufacturing activities and doing everything possible to maintain food and medical services, in cooperation with the private sector 
in Qatar and regional and international partners. With direct services now connecting to Qatar, the global shipping industry has 
demonstrated confidence in Qatar's commitment to ports growth and a leading presence in the region (Mawani Qatar Annual Report, 
2017). The year 2017 recorded a number of cruise tourists visiting Qatar was at Doha Port. The port has undergone a remarkable 
transformation to satisfy the demands of the marine tourism industry. Dredging and construction work on Doha Port's reconstruction 
began in 2018 and included the access channel's realignment. The redeveloped port will serve as a cruise terminal and hold the most 
significant vessels (Qatar Ports Management Company, 2018).  
Cruise Ships Vessel Calls: The graph in the next figure illustrates the differences between the numbers of cruise ships vessel in 2017 
compared to 2018. In the four-quarters after the crisis began in 2017, the number of cruise vessels became only one compared to 
January 2015 as it was four vessels in a sharp decline. The tourists worldwide are searching for countries that have stability and peace 
to enjoy their stay. However, when the Qatar crisis began, the tourists were scared to visit Qatar as they felt that it was not safe to 
travel to a country under the mess. Moreover, it is noticeable that in the fourth quarter of 2017, the number of cruise ships started to 
increase as in October, it was one ship, while in December, and the number of cruise ships reached three, which is an excellent 
indicator to Qatar. In January 2018, the number of cruise ships was five and increased by December 2018, to reach nine. This sign is 
a clear indication that Qatar is speedily recovering (Al Kalbani, Jun 12, 2019).   




Figure 4: Variance from 2017- Cruise Ships Vessel. Source: Qatar Company Ports Managements, 2018. 
Impacts on Qatar Airways: The associated market diversification policy helps Qatar Airways to benefit from the economies of scale 
as the company shares the same departments of H.R., information technology, finance, and product creation, and this approach 
enables the airline to operate cost-effectively (Arab News, 2020). Where the business activity of Qatar Airways was affected after 
the blockade and thus had to go through different types of diversification (Anayiss, 2017), including the following: 
i. Despite more than 30 of its daily flights canceled due to a neighboring blockade, Qatar Airways introduced an innovative 
method to save capacity. The carrier has agreed to lease nine of its Airbus A320 aircraft to British Airways for short-haul 
routes through the summer.  
ii. Qatar Airways acquisition 9.61% of Cathay Pacific, further promoting the investment strategy of Qatar Airways, which 
already includes 20% investment in the International Airlines Group, 10% investment in the LATAM Airlines Group, and 
49% investment in Meridiana.  
iii. Qatar Airways and U.S. private aviation firm JetSuite have reported that Qatar Airways has indirectly taken a minority 
interest in JetSuite and JetSuiteX. Its investment, Qatar Airways joins JetBlue Airways and many private investors as partners 
in both JetSuite and JetSuiteX.  
iv. Qatar Airways plans to operate an airline of at least 100 planes in India, said the carrier, Akbar Al Baker.  
v. Qatar Airways signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Moscow's Vnukovo International Airport, Russia's 
third-largest hub, to buy up to 25% of the total airport shares.  
vi. Accelerate expansion plans with 26 new destinations (Dehbi, 2018). 
 Disadvantages of the Crisis on Qatar 
Although there are advantages to Qatar resulting from the crisis, it has certain disadvantages, mainly on the economy and society. 
The Impact of Blockade on Society: The crisis has an impact on the Qatari society. The social challenges outlined by Doha 
International Family Institute & Qatar Foundation (2018) reported are: 
i. Family Separation: Most of the Gulf families have been affected by unilateral steps to limit travel and other freedom due to 
the blockading countries' measures.  
ii. Family Members Dispute: Some disputes and disagreements occurred between members of Qatari or mixed families in the 
blockading countries and their relatives.  
iii. Family Interactions: Under the blockade, there has been a poor contact between family members, and as a result, family 
interaction has taken a hit.  
Another aspect of crisis can be traced to psychological challenges, as identified by Doha International Family Institute & Qatar 
Foundation (2018). They are as follows: 
i. Psychological trauma: Some families voiced psychological shock when they heard of the blockade declaration and the 
following removal of Qatari citizens from the blockading Gulf States.  
ii. Fear and anxiety: There was a sense of apprehension and worry in many families because of the deterioration of relationships 
between families. As a result of this political crisis, some expressed fear and concern about their future and their children's 
future and "fear of their families."  
iii. Sadness and anguish: Many female respondents expressed feelings of sadness and anxiety because things went wrong.  
iv. Conflicting Feelings: The contradiction/conflict in their emotions towards their relatives were among the most prominent 
issues listed by some of these families.  
v. Loss of Safety and Security: Many families feel vulnerable and insecure.  
Economic Issues 
The boycott involves multiple economic aspects aimed at the repression of Qatar State. The blockading countries blocked entry into 
Qatar of all types of food, pharmaceutical, manufacturing, and other imports (Qatar GDP Annual Growth Rate, 2020). Nevertheless, 
the government was able to ensure that it still meets Qatar's various needs by shortening the local market and attracting more 
individuals and companies to expand their businesses or start new projects that can help Qatar achieve self-sufficiency. Not only was 
the economic harm contained to the State of Qatar, but it also included Qatar's trade and investment with and within the blockading 
countries. As a result of the closure of all border terminals, Qataris were prohibited from entering these countries. The blockading 
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countries prevent any agreement with Qataris and prevent its withdrawal of their funds or disposing of their investments. Hundreds 
of traders and property owners suffered significant financial losses (Al Jazeera, 2017). Nonetheless, these countries have not stopped 
enforcing sanctions and fines on anyone expressing sympathy with Qatar's citizens, but have also banned the movement of Qatari 
currency, the riyal, and blocked all financial transactions with Qatar. It made it increasingly impossible for many to support their 
families and continue to give them daily remittances in those countries. Traveling home or visiting relatives and family friends 
became troublesome, slower, and costlier as people were forced to go to Kuwait or Oman to get to Qatar. It meant that many families 
would face economic difficulties to support themselves and find new ways to provide a decent living for family members (Bouoiyour 
& Selmi, 2019). 
In 2017, and mainly since the blockade's effect, Qatar's inflation has stabilized by about 1%. The impact of the sudden breakdown of 
economic and political relations among many leading trading partners has led to higher prices for daily consumables, particularly 
during the second and third quarters. But with the introduction of government contingency measures and reformatting of supply 
chains, inflationary pressures were gone away. Inflation will be driven by growth within the infrastructure sector in the medium to 
long term with an increase rising to nearly 5% in 2018 due to large-scale projects such as Qatar Rail and preparations for the 2022 
World Cup (Mawani Qatar, 2018). 
 
Figure 5: Qatar Inflation 2019; Source Qatar Statistics Authority, 2019. 
The economic blockade effect caused a decrease in real estate prices (rental and sales) and in gross tourism figures, which means that 
the economy witnessed downward inflation pressures and would continue to average about 2%. New fiscal control initiatives, 
increasing hydrocarbon prices, and increased import costs are primary drivers of inflation in the medium to long term. Any removal 
of the existing economic blockade will alleviate inflation due to lower costs in shipment and transportation (Mawani Qatar, 2018).  
The Crisis Impact on Qatar Airways: the current crisis has adversely impacted Qatar Airways. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and 
Egypt prevented Qatar's Airways from using their airspace and thus suspended all flights to and from Doha, Qatar's capital. The 
blockade forced the airline to deviate from its operations via Turkey and Iran, resulting in a significant rise in flying hours, particularly 
to Africa and South America. Qatar's airways service could not operate nearly 50 flights a day to its central GCC locations. It was a 
shocking occurrence for the airline to lose 18 percent of its total seating ability (Arab News, 2020). According to Gulf Times (2018), 
Qatar Airways began seeking alternative solutions to compensate for the loss of large markets in the aftermath of the crisis.  
Conclusion 
In crises, there are negative or positive outcomes. This research covered the real positive and negative impacts of the crisis on Qatar, 
especially in terms of economy and social aspects. In-depth, the crisis led Qatar to adopt the conflict management strategy, which 
increases the positive conflict outcomes. Through this study, the researcher tried to identify the critical challenges faced by Qatar 
during the crisis and explore options to overcome the difficulties. The focus was placed on a business diversification strategy to 
compensate for the impact of the Qatar crisis. Besides, the conflict management strategy employed by Qatar has given its due 
importance. It is an effective method and is of contemporary significance to change the adverse outcomes into positive ones. Qatar 
used practical tools to loosen the tension and alleviate the negative impact of the blockade. It coordinated trade and businesses, and 
products with Turkey, Iran, and India. 
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